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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
New York Court of Appeals recognizes that insured's contractual
right to notice of cancellation becomes vested upon insurer's
liquidation
Although the insurance industry is primarily state-regulated,'
the nationwide repercussions of insurance carrier insolvencies have
spurred the development of uniform regulations, based on the Uni-
form Insurers Liquidation Act ("Uniform Act"), which is geared
toward the efficient administration of multi-state insurer liquida-
tions.' Consistent with the goal of uniformity, the claims of a de-
funct insurer's creditors are generally fixed and valued as of the
date of adjudication of insolvency,3 and all policies, including those
held by out-of-state insureds, are cancelled by operation of law as
of the same date. 4 Consequently, claims stemming from losses oc-
1 See 2A MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, § 21:1 (rev. vol. 1984).
2 UNIF. INSURERS LIQUIDATION ACT §§ 1-15, 13 U.L.A. 321, 321-53 (1990). Since its en-
actment in 1939, thirty states, including New York, have adopted The Uniform Insurers
Liquidation Act ("Uniform Act"). Id. prefatory note at 321. The Uniform Act recognizes
that an insurance carrier's assets, as well as its policy obligations, are usually scattered
throughout the entire region in which the company does business, often covering a multi-
tude of states. Id. at 322. As a result, the multiplicity of state regulations governing these
widespread assets and liabilities can be problematic when an insurer becomes insolvent and
must liquidate. Id. The Uniform Act anticipates that the states' adoption of a uniform set of
provisions would "greatly facilitate proceedings commenced for the liquidation, rehabilita-
tion or reorganization of insurance companies and [would] promote the equitable distribu-
tion of the assets of defunct insurers." Id. at 323; see also N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7408-7415
(McKinney 1985) (New York version of Uniform Act); Skandia Am. Reins. Corp. v.
Schenck, 441 F. Supp. 715, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating goal of Uniform Act to provide fair
procedure for distributing assets of bankrupt insurer); Ace Grain Co. v. Rhode Island Ins.
Co., 107 F. Supp. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting Uniform Act promulgated to ensure that all
similarly situated creditors receive equal treatment), aff'd, 199 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1952); John
N. Gavin, Competing Forums For the Resolution of Claims Against an Insolvent Insurer,
23 TORT & INS. L.J. 604, 606 (1988) (stating that Uniform Act "intended to establish an
orderly, efficient and fair process" for liquidation of insolvent insurers).
I See 2A RHODES, supra note 1,§§ 22:74-22:75; see also In re Empire State Sur. Co., 214
N.Y. 553, 567, 108 N.E. 825, 828 (1915) (establishing definite date to fix rights and liabilities
of all persons interested in insolvent estate); People v. Metropolitan Sur. Co., 205 N.Y. 135,
140, 98 N.E. 412, 413 (1912) (determining that claims involving policies of insolvent life
insurance company under direction of receiver be confirmed and valued as of dissolution
commencement date) (citing People v. Commercial Alliance Life Ins. Co., 154 N.Y. 95, 98,
47 N.E. 968, 969 (1897)).
" See 17 RHODES, supra note 1, § 67.10. It should be noted that the appointment of a
receiver for an insurance company does not automatically cancel or terminate the insurer's
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curring after this date are ordinarily disallowed as untimely.5 Re-
cently, however, in Digirol v. Superintendent of Insurance,6 the
Court of Appeals held that an insured's right to notice of cancella-
tion pursuant to an express policy provision became vested upon
the insurer's liquidation, thereby requiring the insurer's domicili-
ary or ancillary receiver7 to notify the policyholder that coverage
had terminated before cancellation would be effective."
In Digirol, plaintiff Alan Digirol purchased a multi-peril insur-
ance policy in 1984 for a hotel that he owned in upstate New
York.9 The three-year policy, which included fire insurance, was
issued by Transit Casualty Company ("Transit"), a corporation
domiciled in Missouri and authorized to conduct business in New
York State. 10 According to the explicit terms of the policy, if
Transit cancelled coverage prior to the stated expiration date,
Digirol was entitled to written notification before the cancellation
would become effective. 1
contracts. Id. Rather, it is "an actual adjudication of insolvency [that] ipso facto cancels all
outstanding policies and precludes any claim for subsequently occurring loss." Id. § 67:12;
see, e.g., Thomas v. Land, 30 S.W.2d 1035, 1039 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (terminating surety
bond by operation of law and releasing surety company from liability for future claims upon
adjudication of insolvency).
5 See 2A RHODES, supra note 1, § 22:75. Whether an insolvent insurer remains liable for
a loss depends on the date of the triggering event. See id. §§ 22:74-22:75. Generally, a carrier
is held liable for losses occurring prior to an adjudication of insolvency because they arose
while the policy was in effect. Id. § 22:74. Conversely, since an adjudication of insolvency
usually cancels an insurer's policies by operation of law, all losses occurring after this date
are considered categorically invalid, shielding the bankrupt carrier from further liability. Id.
§ 22:75; see also North River Ins. Co. v. Walker, 65 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1933) (treating all
outstanding policies as automatically canceled upon adjudication of insolvency); Carr v.
Hamilton, 129 U.S. 252, 256 (1889) (treating policyholder losses incurred prior to insurer's
insolvency as creditors entitled to pro rata share of defunct company's assets); Boston A.R.
Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 34 A. 778, 783 (Md. 1896) (barring claims based
upon accidents occurring after liquidation due to cancellation of all policies as of insolvency
date).
6 79 N.Y.2d 13, 588 N.E.2d 38, 580 N.Y.S.2d 140, cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 199 (1992).
See N.Y. INs. LAw § 7408(4), (5). According to the statute, a carrier's "[d]omiciliary
state" refers to "the state in which an insurer is incorporated or organized", and an
"'[a]ncillary state' means any state except a company's domiciliary state." Id.; see also
UNIF. INSURERS LIQUMATION ACT § 1(5)-(6), 13 U.L.A. 328-29 (employing identical defini-
tions in Uniform Act).
s Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 15, 588 N.E.2d at 39, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
9 Id. at 16, 588 N.E.2d at 39, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 141. The claimant had purchased the
Transit policy through a New York insurance agent. Id.
" Id. The effective dates of the three-year policy were February 29, 1984 to February
29, 1987. Id. Notably, February 29 did not occur in 1987.
11 Id. The policy stipulated that Transit could cancel coverage prior to the expiration
date "by mailing to the named insured at the mailing address shown in the Declarations,
1214
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On December 4, 1985, a Missouri court declared Transit insol-
vent, ordered it liquidated, and mandated the cancellation of all
policies as of December 20, 1985.12 Transit's domiciliary receiver in
Missouri published the liquidation order and mailed notice of can-
cellation to all policyholders. Digirol's notice, however, was sent er-
roneously to his prior address and returned undelivered.13 Al-
though his current address was listed in a policy amendment, the
Missouri receiver made no further effort to notify Digirol. 14
On February 16, 1986, Digirol's hotel was destroyed by fire.15
After learning of Transit's insolvency, Digirol submitted a claim to
the carrier's ancillary receiver, the New York Superintendent of
Insurance ("Superintendent"). 6  The Superintendent rejected
written notice stating when not less than ten days thereafter such cancellation shall be ef-
fective." Id.
12 Id. By order of a Missouri court, permanent and deputy special receivers were ap-
pointed to oversee the liquidation within Transit's domiciliary state. Id. In accordance with
the Uniform Act, the New York Supreme Court commissioned the New York Superinten-
dent of Insurance as ancillary receiver to Transit's assets and creditors located in New York.
Id. at 16, 588 N.E.2d at 40, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 142; see also N.Y. INS. LAW § 7410(a) ("When-
ever under the laws of this state [New York] an ancillary receiver is to be appointed in
delinquency proceedings for an insurer not domiciled in this state, the court shall appoint
the superintendent as ancillary receiver.").
1" Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 16, 588 N.E.2d at 40, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 142. The Missouri deputy
receiver published the liquidation order in the New York Law Journal on December 6 and
10, 1985. Id. In addition to receiving a copy of the liquidation order indicating cancellation
of all policies as of December 20, 1985, all policyholders were mailed a memo advising them
that "many states require a longer period from the order of liquidation until the date of
policy cancellation." Id. The letter also suggested that some state guaranty associations
might provide coverage beyond the date of cancellation, and recommended that an insured
seek local counsel in the event of a post-liquidation loss. Id. Nevertheless, Digirol never
received this notice. Id.
"' Id. When the post office returned the notice of cancellation as undeliverable, the
Missouri receiver merely filed it away. Id.
12 Id. at 17, 588 N.E.2d at 40, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
1' Id.; see also N.Y. INs. LAW § 7412(a). The New York statute provides:
In a delinquency proceeding in a reciprocal state against an insurer domiciled in
that state, claimants residing in this state may file claims either with the ancillary
receiver, if any, appointed in this state, or with the domiciliary receiver. All such
claims must be fied on or before the last date fixed for the filing of claims in the
domiciliary proceeding.
Id. (emphasis added). Under the New York statute, the term "reciprocal state" refers to a
state other than New York "in which in substance and effect the provisions of [the Uniform
Act] are in force, including the provisions requiring that the insurance commissioner or
equivalent insurance supervisory official be the receiver of a delinquent insurer." Id. §
7408(b)(6); cf. G.C. Murphy Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 54 N.Y.2d 69, 78, 429 N.E.2d 111, 115,
444 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (1981) (holding claimant must proceed against an insolvent carrier's
domiciliary receiver if no ancillary receiver has been appointed in New York); Vlasaty v.
Avco Rent-A-Car Sys., 60 Misc. 2d 928, 930-31, 304 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (Sup. Ct. Kings
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Digirol's claim because the Missouri liquidation order had canceled
Digirol's policy prior to the date of the fire.17
After denial of the claim again on reconsideration by the Su-
perintendent, the matter was presented to a referee, who con-
cluded that Digirol failed to receive prior written notice of cancel-
lation as required by the policy and recommended that the claim
be honored. 8 Although the supreme court confirmed the referee's
finding of fact, it rejected the recommendations and sustained the
Superintendent's denial of Digirol's claim.' 9 The Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, affirmed.2 °
County 1969) (requiring New York plaintiff to pursue claim against Ohio domiciliary re-
ceiver of insolvent insurer where no ancillary receiver is available).
17 Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 17, 588 N.E.2d at 40, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 142. By rejecting the
claim, the Superintendent was applying the provisions of the Missouri liquidation order to
the New York insured. Id. at 19, 588 N.E.2d at 41, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 143. The drafters of the
Uniform Act were concerned that domiciliary receivers had insufficient authority in ancil-
lary states. See UNIF. INSURERS LIQUIDATION AcT, 13 U.L.A. 321, 322. In addition, the diver-
sity of applicable state laws led the drafters to conclude that "[a]dministration would be
simplified and greater equity would be obtained if the laws of a single state, preferably the
state of domicile of the insurance company, were made to govern all such preferences [of
creditors]." Id. at 323; see, e.g., Dardar v. Insurance Guar. Ass'n, 556 So. 2d 272, 274 (La.
1990) (recognizing authority of domiciliary New York court to issue liquidation order affect-
ing insureds in Louisiana).
The New York statute expressly grants authority to the domiciliary receiver. N.Y. INS.
LAW § 7410(b). "The domiciliary receiver for the purpose of liquidating an insurer domiciled
in a reciprocal state, shall be vested by operation of law with the title to all of the property,
contracts, and rights of action ... of the insurer located in this state .... " Id.; see also Kelly
v. Overseas Investors, Inc., 24 A.D.2d 157, 159, 264 N.Y.S.2d 586, 589 (1st Dep't 1965) (not-
ing that domiciliary receiver of insurer domiciled in reciprocal state generally considered
vested with title to all New York assets of insurer), rev'd on other grounds, 18 N.Y.2d 622,
219 N.E.2d 288, 272 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1966).
18 Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 17, 588 N.E.2d at 40, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 142. The referee deter-
mined that Digirol did not receive the notice of cancellation required by the policy since his
correct address was available to the liquidator. Id.; cf. Dardar, 556 So. 2d at 275 (determin-
ing that claimant did not receive prior notice of cancellation because insurer's affidavit of
mailing lacked verification of names and addresses to whom notices were sent).
" See Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 17, 588 N.E.2d at 40, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
20 See In re Transit Casualty Co., 169 A.D.2d 564, 565, 564 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (1st
Dep't), rev'd sub nom. Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d 13, 588 N.E.2d 38, 580 N.Y.S.2d 140. Affirming the
supreme court's denial of Digirol's claim, the appellate division concluded that under ex-
isting New York law an insured had no further rights against a carrier once the insurer had
been placed in liquidation. Id.; see also People v. American Loan & Trust Co., 172 N.Y. 371,
378, 65 N.E. 200, 201 (1902) (holding that claims of creditors are presentable and fixed as of
date receiver is appointed). The principle is similar under Missouri law. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Land, 30 S.W.2d 1035, 1039 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (terminating surety bond by operation of
law and releasing surety company from future liability upon judgement of insolvency). But
see 17 RHODES, supra note 1, §§ 67:10, 67:12 (noting that initiation of insolvency proceed-
ings does not cancel outstanding policies but actual adjudication of insolvency does).
In Transit, the appellate division also rejected claimant's contention that he had a due
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In a four-to-three decision, the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that Digirol's contractual right to notice of cancellation
had matured upon Transit's liquidation,21 thus requiring notice to
the policyholder before the coverage could effectively terminate.22
Writing for the court, Chief Judge Wachtler reasoned that since
Digirol's proper address was included in the policy, the Missouri
receiver's publication and misdirected mailing failed to satisfy the
contractual obligation to send notice of cancellation to the policy-
holder.23 Emphasizing the lack of adequate notice, the court
deemed the cancellation ineffective and allowed Digirol's claim.24
process right to continued insurance coverage pending notice of Transit's liquidation and
cancellation of all policies. See Transit, 169 A.D.2d at 565, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 419. The court
stated that just as one has no due process right prior to the time that right is created by law,
due process cannot preserve this right after it has perished by operation of law. Id.; cf.
Jewish Memorial Hosp. v. Whalen, 47 N.Y.2d 331, 340, 391 N.E.2d 1296, 1300, 418 N.Y.S.2d
318, 322 (1979) (denying that vested property rights were created by health department
notice that interim rates would be set for reimbursement proceedings, with final rates to be
revised upward or downward).
21 Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 15, 588 N.E.2d at 39, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 141. The court deter-
mined that the claimant's contractual right to prior written notice of cancellation must be
recognized as a valuable property right independent of the right to insurance coverage dur-
ing the policy term. Id. In support of this proposition, the court cited Brock v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 260 (1987), in which a contractual right created by a collective
bargaining agreement was considered a property right protected by due process, id. at 260-
61.
The Court of Appeals did not decide whether due process protected the contract-de-
rived property right, but nevertheless concluded that the claimant's entitlement to notice
was preserved as a vested contractual right. Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 17, 588 N.E.2d at 40, 580
N.Y.S.2d at 142.
22 Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 18, 588 N.E.2d at 4, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 143. "At the time of liqui-
dation in this case that right [to notice of cancellation] matured and what remained to be
done was for the company, or its successor, to perform the contractual obligation by inform-
ing the insured of the impending cancellation." Id.
23 Id. Though the court emphasized that the claimant's right to notice of cancellation
was contract-based, two of the cases cited refer to a statutorily-grounded right to notice, and
a third validates a policy cancellation despite notice having been sent to the wrong address.
Id.; see McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d 164, 177, 519 N.E.2d 309, 314-15, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398,
404 (1987) (requiring mailing actual notice of impending tax lien sale to affected homeown-
ers because of sale's "momentous consequences" under Nassau County Administrative
Code); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Altman, 21 Misc. 2d 162, 167-68, 191 N.Y.S.2d 270, 276-77 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1959) (examining notice provisions of Motor Vehicle Financial Security
Act requiring insurers to mail notification of cancellation of automobile insurance to policy-
holder's known address); Byard v. Royal Indem. Co., 49 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (Sup. Ct. Chemung
County 1944) (lacking proof that insured advised broker of change of address, carrier prop-
erly canceled coverage by mailing notice, pursuant to policy provision, to insured's old
address).
2' Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 19-20, 588 N.E.2d at 42, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 144. In addition to
creditors, statutes controlling the liquidation of bankrupt insurers are concerned with the
interests of policyholders and the public at large. Id. at 19, 588 N.E.2d at 41, 580 N.Y.S.2d
12171993]
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In a critical dissent, Judge Kaye maintained that the court's
decision "lack[ed] any basis in law and add[ed] unwarranted un-
certainty to liquidation proceedings involving multi-state insur-
ers." 25 Noting that the court's holding will force New York receiv-
ers to comply with the specific notice terms of all policies issued by
out-of-state insurers to New York residents, Judge Kaye cautioned
that such a requirement not only unreasonably burdens ancillary
receivers,2' but also undermines the authority of domiciliary
receivers.
Although arguably achieving a laudable result, the court's rec-
ognition of a policyholder's vested right to notice of cancellation
at 143. To this end, applicable statutes are intended to furnish a liquidation framework that
is at once "comprehensive, economical, and efficient." Id.; see Motlow v. Southern Holding
& Sec. Corp., 95 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir.) (deciding that Superintendent of Insurance is state
official best suited to wind up affairs of insolvent insurance companies), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 609 (1938); see also In re Knickerbocker Agency Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 149 N.E.2d
885, 888-89, 173 N.Y.S.2d 602, 606 (1958) (recognizing that exclusive jurisdiction of New
York Supreme Court, in conjunction with Superintendent of Insurance, provides efficient
mechanism for considering all parties' interests in liquidation proceeding); In re Empire
State Sur. Co., 214 N.Y. 553, 568, 108 N.E. 825, 828-29 (1915) (forecasting that efficient
administration of liquidation proceeding dependent on establishing uniform standard for
determining relative rights of all creditors).
25 Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 21-22, 588 N.E.2d at 43, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (Kaye, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Kaye noted that although the liquidation order did not require that notice of
cancellation be given to Transit's policyholders, the Missouri receiver voluntarily published
the order in a variety of states and mailed notice to each insured. Id. at 21, 588 N.E.2d at
43, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (Kaye, J., dissenting). Allowing Digirol's claim, Judge Kaye argued,
effectively held "New York liable for Missouri's misfeasance" of sending the notice to the
wrong address. Id. at 21, 588 N.E.2d at 43, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
-6 Id. at 22-23, 588 N.E.2d at 43-44, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46 (Kaye, J., dissenting). By
expanding the scope of the court's recognition of a vested right to notice, Judge Kaye pos-
ited that the particular notice terms of each policy issued by foreign insurers within this
state would now survive liquidation. Id. at 21, 588 N.E.2d at 43, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (Kaye,
J., dissenting). Judge Kaye envisioned that the New York receiver would now be required to
examine and satisfy the notice requirements of every out-of-state policy issued to New York
residents, an outcome at odds with the Uniform Act's goals of efficient and equitable admin-
istration of insurer liquidation. Id. at 23, 588 N.E.2d at 44, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
2 See id. Although both Missouri and New York adopted the Uniform Act, the court's
granting of Digirol's claim undercut Missouri's authority to establish a definite cancellation
date for all Transit policies, resulting in added exposure to liability for the New York re-
ceiver. Id.; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text (holding Missouri receiver's deci-
sion to cease attempts to notify Digirol of policy cancellation resulted in New York re-
ceiver's liability for post-liquidation claim). Judge Kaye further argued that this result
contravened "the uniform scheme established for liquidation of multi-state insurers." Id. at
23, 588 N.E.2d at 44, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (Kaye, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 2 and
17 and accompanying text (explaining development of Uniform Act and drafter's concern
for domiciliary receiver's lack of authority in other states).
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lacks foundation in established New York law2 and may unduly
expose New York receivers of foreign insurers to liability beyond
that of domiciliary receivers.2" Generally, a bankrupt insurer's
rights and liabilities are fixed and assessed as of the date of the
liquidation order,30 rendering unenforceable all claims involving
28 See N.Y. INs. LAW § 7412(a). Under New York insurance law, when a foreign insurer
has been adjudicated insolvent and placed in liquidation, a claimant may initiate a claim
with either the domiciliary or ancillary receiver, provided that "[a]ll such claims must be
filed on or before the last date fixed for the filing of claims in the domiciliary proceeding."
Id. (emphasis added).
Lacking authority to support a "vested" right to notice of cancellation, the court in-
stead relied on the analogous situation in which a creditor fails to receive notice of the
deadline for submitting claims against a carrier in liquidation, thus requiring acceptance of
the late claim. Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 19-20, 588 N.E.2d at 42, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 144. Never-
theless, that situation is distinguishable from Digirol, because when a claim arises prior to
liquidation, notice of the claim deadline is specifically required by statute. See N.Y. INs.
LAW § 7432(b) ("The superintendent shall notify all persons who may have claims against
such insurer... to present the same to him within the time as fixed."); see, e.g., New York
v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953) (holding that publica-
tion of period for which claims may be filed does not comport with notice requirements of
controlling Bankruptcy Act). Furthermore, the statutory protection, afforded to a claim aris-
ing before an insurer enters liquidation, does not apply where a claimant is deemed to pos-
sess a vested right to notice of cancellation. Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 23, 588 N.E.2d at 44, 580
N.Y.S.2d at 146 (Kaye, J., dissenting). Judge Kaye asserted
[t]hat an insured may be a creditor for purposes of a fixed obligation arising prior
to liquidation does not support the quite different conclusion that an insured is
also a "creditor" for notice purposes. Are all executory contract obligations-or
the expectation that the obligation will be fulfilled-now to be considered
"vested" at the time of entry of a liquidation order? That would signal a remarka-
ble change in the law.
Id. Hesitant to rely on judicial introduction of such a significant change in the administra-
tion of insurer liquidations, Judge Kaye observed that the court's holding "points up the
need for statutory reform, to provide for notice to policyholders in a way that discourages
forum-shopping and assures the objectives of fairness and uniformity that were seemingly
secured by the adoption of the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act." Id. at 25, 588 N.E.2d at
45, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (Kaye, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also In re Professional
Ins. Co., 67 A.D.2d 850, 851, 413 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (1st Dep't 1978) (maintaining that only
legislature may establish and amend notice provisions for claim deadlines against insolvent
insurers), afl'd, 49 N.Y.2d 716, 402 N.E.2d 143, 425 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1980); cf. Dardar v. Insur-
ance Guar. Ass'n, 556 So. 2d 272, 274 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (mandating that Louisiana Com-
missioner of Insurance as liquidator of insolvent insurer comply with statutory termination
procedure requiring notice to policyholder before policy cancellation is effective).
29 See Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 23, 588 N.E.2d at 44, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
20 See In re Empire State Sur. Co., 214 N.Y. 553, 567-68, 108 N.E. 825, 828 (1915). In a
liquidation proceeding, the court possesses the "discretionary power to fix at that time some
date other than the date of the entry of the order of liquidation as the date upon which the
rights and liabilities of the persons interested shall be fixed." Id.; Home Indem. Co. v.
O'Brien, 104 F.2d 413, 419 (6th Cir. 1939) ("[R]ights and liabilities of creditors of domestic
insurance companies become fixed as of the date of the entry of the order directing liquida-
1993] 1219
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losses occurring after this date.3' In effect, the Digirol court's re-
fusal to honor the termination date of the Missouri liquidation or-
der creates two deadlines for the accrual of prospective claims: the
date assigned in the domiciliary proceeding and the date, if ever,
that the policyholder receives actual notice of cancellation.3 2 Con-
sequently, the ancillary receiver will be liable for claims arising be-
tween the court-ordered cancellation date and receipt of actual no-
tice by the policy holder.3 3
It is submitted that the court's decision undermines the legis-
lative goals of continuity and equality underlying the Uniform
Act.3 4 By creating a vested property right to notice of cancellation,
the Court of Appeals has placed the late-notified claimant in the
same category as creditors whose claims were fixed by the liquida-
tion order.35 As a result, the "late" claim will erode the limited
assets of the extinct insurer, diluting the recovery of pre-existing
creditors.36
tion of the corporation."); In re Lawyers Title and Guar. Co., 266 A.D. 322, 327, 42 N.Y.S.2d
177, 181 (1st Dep't 1943) (permanently establishing rights of creditors as of date of liquida-
tion order), afl'd, 293 N.Y. 675, 56 N.E.2d 293 (1944).
s, See supra note 4 and accompanying text. As the dissent notes, the Missouri liquida-
tion order did not require notice to policyholders in order to effectuate cancellation; it
merely decreed that all of Transit's insurance policies would be terminated as of December
20, 1985. Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 21, 588 N.E.2d at 43, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
32 See id.
33 See Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 20, 588 N.E.2d at 42, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 144. Generally, the
only claim available to a policyholder, whose coverage has been terminated prematurely by
carrier liquidation, is for a refund of the unused portion of the premium. See, e.g., Boston &
A.R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 34 A. 778, 783 (Md. 1896) (finding that com-
pany's insolvency resulted in breach of insurance contracts entitling policyholders to value
of canceled policies); Thomas v. Land, 30 S.W.2d 1035, 1039 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (upholding
policyholder's claim for unearned premiums paid on policies extinguished by liquidation of
company); Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 20, 588 N.E.2d at 42, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 144 (noting that
policyholders whose coverage had ceased prior to policy expiration and who properly re-
ceived notice of cancellation made whole by return of excess premium); People v. Commer-
cial Alliance Life Ins. Co., 154 N.Y. 95, 100, 47 N.E. 968, 970 (1897) (holding that policy-
holders were creditors only to extent of premium paid, given that no loss occurred on policy
before insurer's liquidation); People v. Security Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 78 N.Y. 114, 127
(1879) (concluding that "policyholders are creditors of the [insolvent] company for the pre-
sent values of their policies" as of date of insurer's dissolution).
s' See supra note 2 (discussing legislative purpose of Uniform Act).
Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 22, 588 N.E.2d at 43, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (Kaye, J., dissenting);
see also People v. Metropolitan Sur. Co., 205 N.Y. 135, 145-46, 98 N.E. 412, 415 (1912) ("If
one contingent claim is allowed why should not all be allowed, for they all stand on the
same footing? ... While the result in this case is harsh... [i]n the great mass of cases for
which general rules are necessarily made, the result will not be harsh.").
11 See In re Professional Ins. Co., 67 A.D.2d 850, 851, 413 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (1st Dep't
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The Digirol court, it is proposed, contradicted existing author-
ity by preserving coverage under a policy containing a contractual
right to notice until the claimant received actual notice of termina-
tion. In effect, the court ignored the Missouri tribunal's ruling of
cancellation and established independent standards for the qualifi-
cation of claims against insolvent foreign carriers.3 7 By subordinat-
ing the liquidation order to the particular terms of the policy, the
court has constructively bound the New York receiver to the pre-
cise notice terms of all policies issued by out-of-state insurers. In
sum, this decision has subverted the objective of "orderly and eq-
uitable administration of liquidation proceedings, 38 and has fur-
ther clouded the already confusing area of multi-state insurer
insolvencies.
Joseph F. Muratore
1978) (allowing deferred claim to impinge on timely filed claims, causing accelerated dissipa-
tion of security fund and higher insurance premiums to replenish fund), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d
716, 402 N.E.2d 143, 425 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1978); cf. Alliance of Am. Insurers v. Chu,
77 N.Y.2d 573, 578, 571 N.E.2d 672, 674, 569 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (1991) (declaring unconsti-
tutional state legislation diverting existing resources of Property and Liability Insurance
Security Fund to State's general fund, since insurers had protected property right in fund).
See generally Davis J. Howard, Standing to Sue a Carrier's Killers, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 311,
315 (1990) (noting that depletion of insurance fund causes higher premiums, shifting cost to
public).
"See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
Digirol, 79 N.Y.2d at 18, 588 N.E.2d at 41, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
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